27/28th July 1943 - Hamburg.
The Introduction of Window – End of July 1943
Essen, Hamburg Raids and the Hamburg Firestorm.
Window ( or Chaff as it is now known ) was used by the RAF from July 1943 during WW2. It was a radar countermeasure in which aircraft spread a cloud of small, thin pieces of aluminium, metallized glass fibre or plastic which either appeared as a cluster of primary targets on radar screens and swamped the screen with multiple returns. This seriously disrupted the German early warning and defensive radars The Germans had developed a similar system called Duppel but had not used it so far.
There had been a long standing controversy over the operational use of Window and it was important that its use should be exploited as widely as possible before appropriate countermeasures were introduced by the Germans. The first target in a series, Hamburg, was chosen for a variety of reasons. It was very largest port in Europe and its coastal location would give good H2S radar responses. The distinctive shape of the coastline, only 16 miles from the city, would also give a accurate pinpoints for they Pathfinder aircraft while the River Elbe and the dock area would give broad definition for accurate marking. As the second largest city in Germany it housed major ship building facilities and a large worker population. With the short summer nights restricting the cover of darkness the choice of Hamburg would ensure that the bombers were not committed to a long overland route.
The importance of Hamburg to the German war effort also ensured that the city had very strong defences, a factor which had helped him survive 98 previous raids by Bomber Command. There were six major night fighter airfields along the approaches to the city which itself had 54 heavy flak batteries and around 22 searchlight units plus passive defence aids. Not surprisingly the RAF crews had a healthy respect for this target.
The route kept the bombers clear of the defences until the last possible moment. 20 Pathfinder aircraft would drop yellow target indicators and illuminator flares by H2S radar. One minute later eight others would visually mark the target with red target indicators. Four minutes after that the main force would commence bombing and this would be complete in 48 minutes. Window was dropped one bundle per minute from 8 degrees 30 mins east on the inbound leg and to eight degrees east on the return leg. Diversionary raids were laid on against Bremen, Kiel, Lubeck and Duisburg by a 13 Mosquito aircraft. Mining was also to be carried out in the River Elbe.
By midnight the bomber stream had assembled over the North Sea, 791 Lancasters, Halifaxes, Stirlings and Wellingtons. 45 aircraft aborted before the force had travelled far. The weather forecast had predicted a 17 mph wind from the northwest but thanks to radar fixes by individual navigators a chronic error was detected early. It was in fact 12 miles per hour from the opposite direction. No longer were Bomber Command crew was victims of such potentially fatal errors.
The Germans were aware that the raid was developing through with their monitoring of radio traffic throughout the day when the bombers were being prepared for that night operations. The first group of aircraft was also detected assembling over England more than an hour before the German radar on Heligoland reported in the seemingly impossible. A force of an estimated 11,000 bombers was approaching. Bundles of window were swamping the radar with multiple returns. Right on schedule the yellow target indicators cascaded down on to Hamburg which was now on full alert for the attack. The radar operators could now detect the variations in the radar returns with some sports moving slower than others and some seeming to stand still in the air. However tracking of real the aircraft was almost impossible. Night fighter crews was were already airborne circling their assigned beacons ball were for once they were denied the visual vectors. Frustrated some of them set out to try and pick up the bomber stream using their own radar sets but the same swamping returns appeared. Some succeeded however has the more astute radar operators were able to detect the more stable returns amongst the hash but the number of successes was small.
As the first wave of bombers streamed over the city and master searchlights seemed to be moving erratically. Soon it became clear to their radar gun laying teams that their sets were also malfunctioning and both the searchlights and ground crew was were forced to operate without their usual assistance. The screen of the Window was working superbly except for those the aircraft at the highest level which were outside the tumbling, slow falling screen of metal foil. These drew the attention of the night fighters, the leading squadron ( 103 Sqn ) losing three of the four Lancasters which failed to return that night.
The aiming point had been chosen so that the now familiar creep back of the bombing pattern would fall into the mainly residential area. By crippling the life of the city rather than the shipyard production would be reduced. Marking was a little scattered but most fell close to the centre of the city and 728 of the bombers dropped 2284 tons within the space of 15 minutes. Less than half this load fell within 3 miles of the centre of the city and creep back spread for six. Even so severe damage was done to the central and north western districts.
They USAAF joined in with Bomber Command against Hamburg but were forced to withdraw after two days of daylight attacks as the smoke from the RAF raids making it impossible to bomb accurately the industrial targets. Bomber command lost 12 aircraft, 1.5 per cent of have a dispatched force.
The Nazi city of Essen in the heart of the Ruhr and a major contributor to the German war effort was attacked in force the next night, the 25/26 July 1943. Again the use of Window again totally disorganised the German defences and the attack was a considerable success. The Krupp's industrial complex was particularly badly hit with much destruction to surrounding industrial areas in the eastern part of the city. Bomber losses were 3.7% of the force dispatched but that was acceptable for such a devastating success.
The next attack on Hamburg was on the 27/28 July 1943 which resulted in the well documented Firestorm. The previous raid resulted in a considerable number of fires which were still burning and now a high ambient temperature and low humidity created three conditions which produced a firestorm phenomenon which raged for 3 hours everything within the area was destroyed or nearly 40,000 people died, the majority through asphyxiation by carbon monoxide. The German authorities it was a crisis beyond imagination and 1,200,000 people fled the city. Civilian morale came closer to breaking point that any other time bombing war.
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103 Squadron - 24/25th July 1943 - Hamburg
27 aircraft detailed for this attack. First up - F/L D W Finlay and crew in ED767 at 2200. No cloud over the target and the visibility was good. The flak was not up to the usual standard but that was probably because of the new defensive measure - the scattering of metalised strips by our aircraft. This undoubtedly upset the enemy's RDF system. The target was a mass of flames. There were one or two approaches by enemy aircraft but these were avoided. This was a most unlucky raid for the Squadron which lost 3 aircraft. W/O Hardman and crew, W/O O'Hanlon and crew and F/S Moore and crew. First down F/L D W Finlay and crew in ED767 at 0318.
103 Squadron - 25/26th July 1943 - Essen.
21 aircraft detailed for this attack. First up - F/L D W Finlay and crew in ED767 at 2152. The flak and searchlights in the target area were not anything like their usual intensity and appeared to become thoroughly disorganised as the raid progressed. The scattering of metalised strips was again carried out by our aircraft apparently with great success. Weather en route was good with only thin layers of cloud over the target. The attack was a great success with the target enveloped in flame. A large explosion was noted by most crews. P/O Ratcliff and crew had to turn back because of his starboard engine catching fire. He did however drop his bombs on an airfield at Alkmaer causing a fire on the southeast side. F/O Loop and crew returned early because of an unserviceable intercom. He jettisoned his bombs over the sea. S/L Carpenter and crew and F/L Ewer and crew failed to return. All others returned to base. First down F/L D W Finlay and crew in ED767 at 0216.
103 Squadron - 27/28th July 1943 - Hamburg.
23 aircraft detailed for this attack. First up S/L England and crew in JA704 at 2200. Cloud conditions over the target were variable but nothing more than 5/10ths. Flak was intense over the target but thought to me mainly barrage fire especially as the search lights were most erratic. There were several aircraft sightings which suggests that the searchlights may, in view of their disorganisation due to our counter measures, have been providing a light background with which to silhouette our aircraft for the fighters benefit. One Me 109 was seen shot down by heavy flak. The target appears to have been a mass of flames with several big explosions occurring and smoke rising to about 24,000ft. F/S Annis and F/S Carter both had engine trouble and returned early after jettisoning, the former all his bombs and the later his HE only. All aircraft returned to base. First down W/O Stoneman and crew in ED645 at 0320.
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24/25 July 1943 - Hamburg
791 aircraft - 347 Lancasters, 246 Halifaxes, 125 Stirlings, 73 Wellingtons involved in the first raid of the 'Battle of Hamburg'. 12 aircraft - 4 Halifaxes, 4 Lancasters, 3 Stirlings, 1 Wellington - lost, 1.5 per cent of the force. 'Window' was used for the first time on this night. Conditions over Hamburg were clear with only a gentle wind. The marking - a mixture of H2S and visual - was a little scattered but most of the target indicators fell near enough to the centre of Hamburg for a concentrated raid to develop quickly. 728 aircraft dropped the bombs bombs in 50 minutes. Bombing photographs showed that less than half of the force bombed within 3 miles of the centre of Hamburg and a creepback 6 miles long developed. But, because Hamburg was such a large city, severe damage was caused in the central and north-western districts, particularly in Altona, Eimsbüttel and Hoheluft. The Rathaus, the Nikolaikirche, the main police station, the main telephone exchange and the Hagenbeck Zoo (where 140 animals died) were among the well-known Hamburg landmarks to be hit. Approximately 1,500 people were killed. This was the greatest number of people killed so far in a raid outside the area in which Oboe could be used.
33 Lancasters of No 5 Group returning from North Africa bombed Leghorn docks but the target was covered by haze and bombing was scattered. No aircraft lost.
13 Mosquitos carried out diversionary and nuisance raids to Bremen, Kiel, Lübeck and Duisburg; 6 Wellingtons laid mines in the River Elbe while the Hamburg raid was in progress and there were 7 OTU sorties. No aircraft lost.
25/26 July 1943 - Essen
705 aircraft - 294 Lancasters, 221 Halifaxes, 104 Stirlings, 67 Wellingtons, 19 Mosquitos. The commander of the American VIII Bomber Command, Brigadier-General Fred Anderson, observed this raid as a passenger in an 83 Squadron Lancaster. This was an attempt to achieve a good raid on this major target while the effects of 'Window' were still fresh. The raid was successful, with particular damage being recorded in Essen's industrial areas in the eastern half of the city. The Krupps works suffered what was probably its most damaging raid of the war. The next morning, Doktor Gustav Krupp had a stroke from which he never recovered; this saved him from being charged with war crimes after the war. 26 aircraft - 10 Halifaxes, 7 Stirlings, 5 Lancasters, 4 Wellingtons - lost, 3.7 per cent of the force.
6 Mosquitos to Hamburg and 3 each to Cologne and Gelsenkirchen, 17 aircraft minelaying in the Frisians, 7 OTU sorties. No losses.
27/28 July 1943 - Hamburg
787 aircraft - 353 Lancasters, 244 Halifaxes, 116 Stirlings, 74 Wellingtons - returned to Hamburg. Brigadier-General Anderson, again flew in a Lancaster and watched this raid. The centre of the Pathfinder marking - all carried out by H2S on this night - was about 2 miles east of the planned aiming point in the centre of the city, but the marking was particularly well concentrated and the Main Force bombing 'creep back' only slightly.
This was the night of the firestorm, which started through an unusual and unexpected chain of events. The temperature was particularly high (30° centigrade at 6 o'clock in the evening) and the humidity was only 30 per cent, compared with an average of 40-50 per cent for this time of the year. There had been no rain for some time and everything was very dry .The concentrated bombing caused a large number of fires in the densely built-up working-class districts of Hammerbrook, Hamm and Borgfeld. Most of Hamburg's fire vehicles had been in the western parts of the city, damping down the fires still smouldering there from the raid of 3 nights earlier, and only a few units were able to pass through roads which were blocked by the rubble of buildings destroyed by high-explosive bombs early in this raid. About half-way through the raid, the fires in Hammerbrook started joining together and competing with each other for the oxygen in the surrounding air. Suddenly, the whole area became one big fire with air being drawn into it with the force of a storm. The bombing continued for another half hour, spreading the firestorm area gradually eastwards. It is estimated that 550-600 bomb loads fell into an area measuring only 2 miles by 1 mile. The firestorm raged for about 3 hours and only subsided when all burnable material was consumed. The burnt-out area was almost entirely residential. Approximately 16,000 multi-storeyed apartment buildings were destroyed. There were few survivors from the firestorm area and approximately 40,000 people died, most of them by carbon monoxide poisoning when all the air was drawn out of their basement shelters. In the period immediately following this raid, approximately 1,200,000 people - two thirds of Hamburg's population - fled the city in fear of further raids.
3 Mosquitos to Duisburg, 6 Wellingtons minelaying in the River Elbe, 11 OTU sorties. 1 Mosquito.
Compiled by David Fell mostly from 103 and 576 Squadron ORBs, 1 Group ORB, By Day and by Night: Bomber War in Europe, 1939-45. Ken Merrick, Middlebrook's Bomber Command War Diaries.
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