Operation – Magdeburg – 21/22 January 1944
This was another long range area attack on the Nazi city of Magdeburg, a major industrial centre, deep in the heart of the German Reich. The German fighter controllers were quick to respond. Their night fighters intercepted the bomber stream very early on and were in contact all the way to the target. Losses were very heavy, the worst on one night for Bomber Command so far. However the two RAF Elsham Wolds Squadrons, 103 Squadron and 576 Squadron, escaped unscathed.
There were stronger than forecast winds which resulted in some bombers arriving before the Pathfinders had marked the target and a number of aircraft bombed to the south of the city but this was corrected as the attack progressed.
In the aftermath of this affair there was serious disagreement between the Air Ministry and Bomber Command over the conduct of the RAF Bomber Command offensive which the Air Ministry saw as non-cooperation with their bombing policy. This led to a new directive on the 28th January 1944 forcing Arthur Harris and Bomber Command to cooperate in a combined Anglo American assault against the German aircraft industry.
After the successes in 1943 of the Battle of the Ruhr and Battle of Hamburg the Battle of Berlin during the winter of 1943/44 was not going well with losses bordering on the unsustainable level and mixed results to show for it.
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103 Squadron detailed 14 aircraft, one of which did not take off due to becoming bogged down while taxying. There was 10/10 cloud over the whole route but this broke to 3-6/10ths with tops at about 3-6000 ft over the target where both ground and sky markers were seen. The spot fire “route markers “ were not seen through the clouds. There were a number of sightings but no combats developed. Defences over Magdeburg were slight but on the return journey there was much heavy flak and searchlight activity in the so called gap between Bremen and Hamburg as well as over the cities themselves. Bombing was from between 21000ft and 23000ft at around 2300.
All crews returned to base.
First up- F/O J Hart and crew – JB746 – 2000
First down - F/L R F Griffin and crew – JB530 – 0237
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576 Squadron detailed 10 aircraft. F/O Shearer failed to take off due to aircraft unserviceability. Weather en route was mostly 10/10ths cloud which broke up on approach to the target to 2/10ths – 8/10ths. Markers and bombs were scattered to the south of the target area but a much better concentration was achieved as the attack progressed when pathfinder marking became more accurate. The glow of the fires was visible from 150 miles away on the return journey with smoke reported to 15000 ft. Flak defences were slight to moderate with a few ineffective searchlights. There was considerable fighter activity in the target area but no combats were reported. Fighter flares were reported on the route from the enemy coast to the target and on the homeward journey. Fighters were especially active between Hamburg and Bremen. No ground detail is recorded in the target area due to a thin layer of cloud.
All crews returned to base.
First up – Sgt A E Bodger and crew – JA715 – 1925
First down – F/S H M C Thomas and crew – ND386 – 0220
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1 Group Operational Record book remarks – 132 Lancasters took off to attack Magdeburg. In the target area could conditions varied from 2-8/10ths with tops 4-8000 ft. The layer was thin enough to enable crews to see the target indicatros burning on the ground. The winds were found to be stronger that forecast and as a result the early arrivals for the most part over shot the target and were forced to make a circuit before bombing.. It seems probable that in the early stages he major part of the attack was directed south, south east and south west of the target. In the later stages a much better concentration developed. That the attack finally succeeded in raising very big fires in the target area is indicated by the fact that the glow from these fires was clearly visible some 100 miles from the target area on the homeward journey. Ground defences which were negligible in the early stages were never more than moderate and the defences appeared saturated in the last stages. 4 aircraft attacked the last resort target, two due to engine trouble, one through having overshot the target through being early on ETA and the 4th being unable to identify the primary due to the absence of Pathfinder marking. 10 aircraft with technical faults returned early and three are missing.
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21/22 January 1944 - 648 aircraft - 421 Lancasters, 224 Halifaxes, 3 Mosquitos - on the first major raid to Magdeburg. The German controller again followed the progress of the bomber stream across the North Sea and many night fighters were in the stream before it crossed the German coast. The controller was very slow to identify Magdeburg as the target but this did not matter too much because most of the night fighters were able to stay in the bomber stream, a good example of the way the Tame Boar tactics were developing. 57 aircraft - 35 Halifaxes, 22 Lancasters - were lost, 8.8 per cent of the force; it is probable that three quarters of the losses were caused by German night fighters. The Halifax loss rate was 15.6 per cent. The heavy bomber casualties were not rewarded with a successful attack. Some of the Main Force aircraft now had H2S and winds which were stronger than forecast brought some of these into the target area before the Pathfinders' Zero Hour. The crews of 27 Main Force aircraft were anxious to bomb and did so before Zero Hour. The Pathfinders blamed the fires started by this early bombing, together with some very effective German decoy markers, for their failure to concentrate the marking.
22 Lancasters and 12 Mosquitos of 5 and 8 Groups carried out a diversionary raid to Berlin; 1 Lancaster lost.
111 aircraft - 89 Stirlings, 12 Lancasters, 10 Mosquitos - carried out raids on 6 flying bomb sites in France without loss.
8 Mosquitos to Oberhausen and 5 to Rheinhausen, 8 RCM sorties, 5 Serrate patrols, 8 Wellingtons minelaying off St Nazaire, 16 OTU sorties. No aircraft lost.
Total effort for the night: 843 sorties, 58 aircraft (6.9 per cent) were lost. The number of aircraft lost was the heaviest in any night of the war so far.
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Item compiled by David Fell. Many thanks to Richard Worrall, Department of History, Politics & Philosophy, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK. His Article on this raid ( ‘Crossing the Red Line?’: The Air Staff, Sir Arthur Harris, and the Magdeburg Operation of 21/22 January 1944 ) and the aftermath is quite superb and well worth reading.
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